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I. Introduction 
Cople~ Place, a $350 million mixed use development in downtown 
Boston, is unique in its size and diversity. The development entails 
two major hotels, a convention facility, an up-scale department store, 
260,000 square feet retail space, cinemas, 800,000 square feet office 
space, and 100 units of mixed-income housing. The history of the devel-
opment -- the transjtion from concept to reality - is quite complex. 
The developer, the Urban Investment Development Company (Ur:oc ), 
first expresf!ed interest in the site in early 1977. The groundbreaking 
ceremony took yla.ce in November, 1980. The three-and a half years in 
between were filled with negotiation, trade-offs, and co-optation. 
The early part of the process comprised leasing agreements from the 
State of Massachusetts for the site, a 9.5 acre land-air pa.reel above 
the Mass Turnpike in Back Bay. A Citizen Review Committee participated 
from the beginning. The latter part of the process involved the City of 
Boston in the application for a federal Urban Development Action Grant 
(UDAG). 
The development process of Copley Place signals a unique !mple-
men ta tion of public and private interests. The circumstances leading up 
to the groundbreaking and beyond create an intriguing account of bar-
gaining and special intere~t pres~ires. T:~e magnitude of the project 
will result in, and has already witnessed, strong implications for the 
adjacent neighborhoods a..~d the City of Boston. 
I 
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II. The Development Framework 
Local government is playing an increasingly important role in 
urban investment~ Having recognized that the economic growth rate lies 
in t he birthrate of new business (cornia, 1978 p.-- ), public officials 
have begun t o devise ways of attracting investment and shaping it to 
ma.x1Jnum -publi c benefit. 
Public officials have demonstrated an ability to exert themselves 
successfully to affect their fiscal well-being. With the goal of bringing 
positive impacts on emplo~ local tax base and business activity, 
the public sector is using both philosophical and active tools to work 
with potential developers. Philosophically, the importa.~ce of offering 
a receptive polit ical climate cannot be understated. As a developer 
weighs the investment optfons, a public official can offer a hospitable 
and attractive communlty environment that may help to persuade the deci-
sion (Co:rnia, 1978, p. - - ). The developer must work with the public 
officials ~an amicable rela t ionship from the beginning can help to 
foster a working alliance advantageous to both sides. 
The public sector may also employ active intervention techniques 
in the development process. The city has the traditional tools of zoni~~ 
and service delivery at their disposal, as well as more innovative devel-
opment controllil (HUD, 1980, p.16). The use of density bonuses can work 
to concentrate development in designated areas; the offering of air 
rights and site parceling can bring development, as with Copley Place. 




trends. substantial development interest, regardless of public inter-
vention, is Jased upon profit motivation. 
Because the 'Ptlblic and private sectors are so differ ent in 
thei r orientation, it is crucial that they understand one another. 
The public sector must strive to determine market forces, to identify 
the community's assets in terms of development criteria, and to learn 
effectiv( packaging ·.echniques •. With a thorough understanding of what 
the private inv~stor is looking for, the public official can package an 
idea for dev&lopment consideration. 
In addition to a market understanding, the public sector must 
have a financial understanding of the development process. An official 
at the Boston Redevelopment Authority has stated that the financial re~ 
quirements of a developer are legitimate (Hollister, 1980, p.28). A 
lengthy planning process and uncoordinated public sector intervention 
cost a developer a large sum of money, enough in fact, to result in the 
inability to actually constz:uct a project • . If a developer strings out 
his assets during the planning stage, then he can risk the construction 
capital needed to begin. The city can help immeasura.bly by being prepared 
for potential development projects. The economic growth or revitalization 
of a community is promoted by cutting down on bureaucratic red tape which 
slows the process (Cornia, 1978, p.-- ). The city can strive for inter-
agency coordination to alleviate misunderstanding and inefficiency. 
Also, community involvement is crucial during the planning process to 
avoid problems during·an impact assessment which costs a developer. 
Economic development requires a partnership which is tha critical 
ingredient in areas of financial feasibility, timing and location (HUE, 
1980, p.21). The joint· venture between the pg~lic and private sector 
I 
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actors is often the answer to insuring smooth development projects. The 
partn~rship, from the beginning, helps to ensure a development that 
occurs more expeditiously, with success for both parties. 
The cooperative public/private investment trend is a relatively 
new phenomenon. The gradual realization that businesses were choosing 
to locate in suburban and exurban areas resulted in an attempt for a 
more active local participation in development decisions. The public 
sector, in assuming the role of partner, is bringing a new level of 
expertise into the .more traditional "reactive" position played by a 
local official in the past. The evidence of involvement is f0wtd in the 
formalization of public/private development ventures and the skill and 
sophistication of public personnel in the planning and implementation 
of projects in their community (NcOED, 1978, p.1). 
The role of the local official and the developer varies according 
to a number of factors (U.S. Conf. of Mayors, N.D. p.1). The economic 
situation may call for a financial partnership in which the public 
sector leverages ~rivate investment with public dollars, as with the 
Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) program. Initiated in 1977 under 
the Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the program requires 
a leveraging ratio of at least three to one private/public dollars. The 
offer of public money is used to persuade investment in declining urban 
areas to promote jobs and revitalization. 
Another factor which shapes the role played by each partner is the 
political setting (US Conf. of Mayors, N.D. p.1). The public sector 
should assure a favorable governmental and community attitude. From 
I 
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the developer's perspective, there is a great need for consistency of 
treatment by government along with a flexibility of public assistance. 
(Borut, 1979, p.4). In cases where political in-fighting overcome con-
sistency and reception, a developer may assume a more offensive role, 
thereby destroying a working partnership. 
Motivation and capacity also help to set the role of the partners 
(us Conf. of Mayors, N.D. p.1). Obviously, the extent to which each 
partner is committed to the project determines the degree of voluntary 
participation. Cooperative efforts are most successful with an under-
lying concensus between the public and private sectors that their 
partnership is a necessary condition for urban reinvestment (US Conf. of 
Mayors, N.D., p.1) • 
. However, some feeling exists among urban activists that private 
investment is not always the best a.newer. According to Frank Smizik of 
the Mass Law Refo:ti:i Institute (the organization representing 8 South End, 
Boston residents who are suing HUD and the City of Boston because of the 
. 
displacement that will result from Copley Place -- HUD has granted an 
$18.8 million UDAG for the project), private investment, leveraged with 
public money, is considered ~ solution to blighted areas. He feels 
that too often, these projects go ahead without the consideration of 
all of the impacts. He has ''no quarrel with private investment, but 
there must be a plan to handle its impacts on minorities - particularly 
in a city like Boston where they have no place to go if they're dis-
placed." Therefore, local officials involved in economic development 
planning must balance the desires of profit-motivated developers against 
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the public interest goals of the community (HUD, 1980, p.10). Theim-
mediate outputs of a develop~ent project -- expanded tax base and job 
creation - must be weighed in terms of the real outcomes-displacement. 
The concept of leveraging private investment and providing suppor-
tive market conditions is at the heart of urban economic developm-ent 
planning (NCUED, 1978, p.1). To maintain a viable economy, the public 
sector must join hands wi th potential developers and take a stand in what 
happens to a community. 'lbe basic components in support of developmeni 
are a favorable attitude, flexible tools and knowledgeable person.~el 
(Botu.:t, 1979, p.4). When utilized properly and to the best advantage, 
the public sector can effectively guide private investment by employing 
the available tools of land use and zoning, infrastructure and property 
tax abatement. Preparedness works to avoid the destructive polarization 




The Copley Place Site had been a vacant parcel for over 20 years. 
In t..~e late 1950's, the area was cleared for the Mass. Turnpike Extension 
into Boston. Before that time, the South End was joinad physically and 
architecturally with Back Bay. Huntington Ave. had been lined with fine, 
old buildings that integrated with the historically significant structures 
nearby ~ the Boston Public Library, the Copley Plaza Hotel, and Trinity 
Church. Nearby, the Prudential Center was built on a site of old rail-
road yards, further 'cleaning up' the area. Since the building of the 
turnpike, the City has attempted to identify an appropriate development 
for the site. 
In the 1965 Boston General Plan the city planners called for a 
large-sca,le develo'Pment on the site to work in conjunction with a. new 
:Back Bay Transportation Center. However, neither plan was implemented. 
The priorities for development were placed elsewhere in Back Bay with 
the Prudential Center expansion in the 1960 1s and the John Hancock 
Tower in the 1970's. Even though several architectural firms attempted 
to devise a development scheme that would overcome the severe physical 
constraints of the site, none could achieve an economically viable 
solution. 
The structural difficulties of the site are due to its location 
both next to and over the Massachusetts Turnpike. A development would 
have to be built on air rights. 'Ihe site's physical constraints involve 




Until recently, the City was unable to attract serious develop-
ment proposals. The Clty•s Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy 
prepared with U.S. EDA funding, called for a targeted development in 
the area that would overcome these constraints -- one that would stimu-
late investment and the creation of jobs. The Strategy is part of a 
program instituted to counteract the effects of job losses and the 
shift to greater specialization in services, which result in high un~ 
employment among minorities and low-income persons. 
Several factors contributed to the recognition of the Copley site's 
potential for a large-scale project. The tremendous demand for available 
office space in Boston encouraged an attempt to devise a feasible plan. 
Boston's rental office market is one of the strongest in the c01ntry 
with an occupancy rate hovering near 99%. The rent-up of the Hancock 
To~er put an end to the availability of office space inthe Copley Square 
area. With the Boylston Street retail area facelift, referred to by some 
as the "uptown Paneuil Hall," a strong demand for"ad~itional retail 
space arose. 
Physical improvements to the surrounding have made the site more 
attractive. The renovation of the Copley Plaza Hotel and the completion 
of the Boston Public Library addition provided significant contributions 
to :Back Bay appearance. Also, the Sheraton Hotel expanded sliccessf"ully 
and the Saks Fifth Avenue store was added to the Prudential Center. 
Finally, firm plans for the reconsturction of the Back Bay Amtrak 
Ra.ilraod Station wa:re made. These plan3 include .realignment of the 
r 
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Southwest Corr.idol'* and the addi t±on of a new rapid trcsnsi t route 
(the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (MBTA) orange line) with a 
major stop at the Back Bay station. As a..~ indicator of commitment, in 
March 1982, the :M.BTA announced the tra\ferral of $2.5 million from the 
rider shelter program to the funding for the reconstruction of the 
Station. 
The combination, therefore, of both physical improvements to th~ 
area, and strong State and City commitment to a Copley Place proposal, 
prompted renewed developer interest in the site. The development now 
under construction was proposed by the Urban Investment Development 
Company (UIDC), a division of Aetna Life Insurance Corp, in early 1977. 
The development opportunity followed years of political negotiation 
with the Park Pl aza project**, _another development scheme for downtown 
.Boston, City officials were sensitive to repeating a similar hassle. 
With the Park Plaza li'lcident, the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) 
published development guidelines and solicited bids in a competition. 
A developer for Park Plaza was designated and his detailed plans were 
then subjecte~ to a 1971 state Environmental Impact Review (EIR). The 
plan drew "DUblic criticism and delayed approval of the project for three 
years. By this time, a supplemental EIR was required to update the 
assessment. The original developer withdrew because of the lengthy 
pla.nnlng process, and ten years were lost. When approached with the 
*The Southwest Corridor was a highway planned to link downtown Boston 
with the suburbs to the southwest. Under the highway moratorium imposed 
by Gcv. Francis Sargent, the land was turned over to the MBTA for use 
as a rapid transit southwest line. 
**Park Plaza, located about ! mile from the Copley Site, had been a 
develcI>inent se.heme proposing a hotel, retail, and office spaae. 
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Copley proposal, the City and State were detennined not ~1 commit the 
same error. 
rl. The Planninl! Process 
The developer, UIDC, was required to engage in a two phase nego-
tiation process: first, with the State, and second, with the City. '!he 
site was owned by the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, so UIDC needed 
first to negotiate for use of the property. '!hen, the City became in-
volved as the central public participant in the process with permit 
approvals and the Urban Development Action Grant application. 
The selection of UIDC as the developer for the Copley site marks 
a unique process of a front-end approach to impact assessment (Hollister, 
1980, p.22)-. UIDC demonstrated interest in developing the Copley Place 
site in early 1977, and the State decided to grant an option oti the pTo-
perty for a 6-month period while proceeding wit.~ the citizen review and 
impact assessment. State Planning Director Frank Keefe advocated the 
early desienation of a developer to speed the planning process. UIDC was 
seen as a strong developer with a good track record. UIIX: is a w'nolly-
owned subsidiary of Aetna Life and Casualty, "the nation's largest 
diversifi~d financial organization," according to a company brochure. 
The most recent development completed by UIIX: was Chicago's Water Tower 
Place, a 3.1 million square ft., 74-story mixed-use ~omplex (UIDC, 1982). 
The Governor Michael Dukakis agreed to Keefe's plan, and on April 
18, 1977, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA) signed a Memorandum 
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of Understanding with UIDC "during which UIDC will engage in engineering 
and market analyses and the Turnpike Authority will refuse to negotiate 
or lease its Copley Square land and air rights to any other party ••• 
at the end of six months, everyone will have a full understanding of the 
constraints and opportunities at Copley Square, and a decision can be 
made by both the developer and the sta~a and the city public sector 
agencies as to whether it makes sense to proceed into an option" (Keefe, 
9/22/77). 
UIDC approached the state with the support of the Western Inter-
national Hotels who were committed to building an 800-room luxury hotel 
as part of the Copley Place program. Western had approached the State 
earlier, alone, with a plan to build a hotel on the land section of the 
parcel, but could not convinae the MTA to agree (Hollister, 1980, p.30). 
The inclusion of a hotel met with favor from the public officials. A BRA 
study, completed in 1976, concluded that, "In order to optimize its 
competitive po~ition, ~oston needs convention-oriendted hotel rooms 
providing 1600-1800 rooms and located in proximity to its convention 
facilities" (BRA, 1976, p.4): namely, the John B. Hynes Auditorium, 
located 3 blocks form Copley Place. The demand for hotel space was keen, 
and a developer with a major hotel chain in hand was welcome •• 
With the Memorandum of Understanding, UIDC began planning the 
d~velopment • .At that time, basic issues of site usage, massing, and the 
interrelationships of the program elements were considered. The initial 
intention was to design the tall buildings away from Copley Square to 
reduce the perceived scale (UI~, 1980, p.5). As the schematic plans 
progressed, ur:oo attempted to locate the tall buildings away from 
12 
the 'furnpike ramps to avoid construction of major structures over the 
greatest s ite obstructions. 
The state brouf,tlt in the City as a participant in the oversight 
of the planning, th& Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) acting as the 
City's representative. 'lbe Office of state Planning organized -the Citizen 
Review Committe (c.ttc ) under the direction of Dr. Tunney r~ee of MIT. 
In May 1977, the CRC group members were selected and assembled. The CRC 
was made up of neighborhood organizations from the South End, Back Bay, 
and the Fenway sections of Bos ton. The organizations were representative 
of virtually all the impacted persons, both middle-class prof essionals 
and low-income minorities. fue Back Bay F'eder ation represented area 
busines $es end ins tit .itions . In all, the CEC membership a."'ld its variety 
highlight the complex issiies involved wit3 Copl ey Place (Hollister, 1960, 
p. 34). 
Participation by the public in reviewing a project the size of 
Copley Place is unprecedented in Boston. According to Teri Weidner, 
Director of Communications at UI:OC, the CRC process was more extensive 
than any other with which UIDC had been involved. Y.s. Weidner states 
that the entire citizen participation process amounted to an expense of 
$6 million to the developer (.Weidner interview). In the beginning, UIDC 
was not certain as to how extensive the CP.C involvement would be, but 
it soon became clear that the State and City were, at this point, behind 
t~e ~roc ess and would back the citizens ( Holli~ter, 1980, p.38). 
The CRC process began in earnest. The d€ailine for their final 
recommendations f or the project was September, 1977, which allowed only 
'\ 
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3-4 months r eYiew. A total of 19 meetings were held throughout that 
first period. 'rhe sessions were devoted to issues of community economic 
development, neighborhood stability, impact on business, physical de-
sign, and traffic impact ~ addressed by individual task forces within 
the CRC (UIDC, 1980, p.5). 
Lee di'rected the early meetings to provide a basic level of under-
standing. These early workshops offered information regarding the phy-
sical and social environment, legal requirements, and the developer's 
perspective (Hollister, 1980, p.35). Various technical experts were on 
hand to answer questions, such as the state's Central Transportation 
Planning Staff. Lee himself dealt with questions concerning physical 
planning. A UIDC official, Dln Gifford, lectured on real estate devel-
opment , and a State ~lanning r epr esentative handled regulatory control 
ouestions ( ~ollister, 1980, p.35). (note: There was very little news-
paper co·terage of Copley at this point. The BRA file begins with their 
involvement in the process). 
Throughout the summer the CRC met, and at the end of June, an 
interim report specif led certain issues of concern. These issues included 
physical design, land use, jobs, pedestrian access, traffic, housing, 
wind and shadows, and economic impact (UIDJ, 1980, p.5). FUrther devel-
opment in workshops resulted in CRC Final Reconnnendations, delivered 
Septe!Ilber 22, 1977. The recommendations took form as goal statements 
followed by general guidelines for action a.n:l specific. steps to take to 
achieve the desired end. The goalB w6re as follows: (1) Community Economic 
Development; (2) :::\etail Impact; (3) South End Stabilization; (4) Staging; 
(5) '1nssine ; (6) Land Use; (7) Pedestrians; (8) Traffic; and, (9) Envir-
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onmental Impact (CRC, 1977). '!be issues brought up at this early point 
in the planning process remained in the negotiations until the end. 
Meanwhile, as the Memorandum of Understanding had called for, 
UIDC undertook its own feasibility studies (UIDC, 1980, p.5). The . 
. UIDC planners were conceptualizing the size and scale of the various 
project components , the hotel, retail, and office spaces. It became 
clear that the bridging of the Turnpike, ramps, and rail tracks would 
be enormously expensive. According to UIDC, it was at this early point 
in the planning that some sort of piblic subsidy was seen to be necessary, 
as well as an expanded pla.n to help absorb these costs. 
UIDC considered over a half-dozen design concepts during 1977 
(UIDC, 1980, p.16-34). F.a.ch was modified to include the imformation from 
the cnnsulting studies. Finally, 3 alternatives were presented to the pub-
lic which provided a "workable concept plan" (UIDC, 1980, p.6). A scale 
model was developed to illustrate the conclusions of the analysis. The 
CRC recommendations were incorporated into the 3.alternatives. The 
recommendations called for 3 major modifications: (1) Housing -- UIDC 
agreed to the inclusion of 100 units of mixed-income housing after the 
State and City officials insisted upon following the CRC idea; (2) Parcel 
ncn -- UIDC agreed to develop this paroel (i.t is the designated area for 
the Neiman-Marcus department store in the project) on Dartmouth Street, 
which they had proposed to leave vacant; (3) Access -- UIDC agreed to 
provide b~tter vehicular and ·pedestrian access into and around the 
project (UIDC, 1980, p.7). 
The design modification process continued, and in June, 1978, UIDC 
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presented a revised preliminary design which they felt was both fina.n-
cially feasible and in conformance with CRC guidelines. The June 1978 
desien consisted of 1 hotel, 2 department stores, a shopping mall, an 
office building, a par king ga.ra~, and the housing. At this point, the 
design process was frozen so that :the appropriate drawing could be arti-
culated. This design also became the basis for the environmental lmpact 
studies, which were initiated during the summer of 1978 (UIJ)C, 1980, p.8). 
At this time, Keefe announced that the site and air rights would 
not be sold to the developer, fee simple, but rather the MTA would lease 
the property to UIDC. The negotiations for a lease rent schedule began 
since the ba.sic issues of construction were resolved. (Hollister, 1980, 
The CRC, which had been dormant since the September, 1977 Final 
RecooJnendations, was reactivated to review the latest design proposal. 
~"'hroughout the summer, the CRC met at 7 workshops to discuss impacts 
-that were not addressed in detail during the previous sw:amer. This 
second phas9 of the CRC was organized by Prof. Lee. In Lee's words, 
this phaae of the CRC process was, "'to keep the scheme within acceptable 
limits. 11he analysis of impacts that occurred during the second half of 
1978 did notdirectly change the development scheme, but it made the 
lease agreement possible and acceptable" (Hollister, 1980, p.41). The 
impact iasues discussed were effects on Back Bay businesses, population 
compositlon of surrounding neighboJ;hoods, air quality, and other envir-
onmantal impacts (UIDC, 1980, p.195). 
In Ootober, 1978, the Draft Environmental Impact Review (EIR) was 
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rele..ased by t.~e consulting firm hired by U~, Environmental Research 
and Technology, Inc. However, earlier that Fall, U~ announced a design 
change that included at third department store. The consultants did not 
have sufficient time to fully assess the impact of the preferred design, 
so they extrapolated the original design impacts to expand the analysis. 
The CRC and the public officials accepted the EIR, but insisted upon a 
more complete analysis at a later date. However, before the end of the 
year, U~ again revised the design, to ~educe the retail and increase 
the hotel and office components (UIDC, 1980, p.8). It was felt that the 
Boston market could not sustain 3 department stores (earlier interest 
expressed by potential department store tenants had softened), while 
demand mushroomed for the other types of deveopment. During the spring 
of 1979, the design work concentrated on a two-hotel, 1-depa.-rtme1i~ sto't"'e 
program. 
Meanwhile, political events at the state level temporarily confused 
the negotiations. Governor Dukakis and his advigors had been working both 
with the developer and the City since the inception of the project. Keefe, 
the director of State Planning and Fred Salvucci, Transportation Secre-
tary, had been instrumental in representing the State's interests. Inter-
estingly, Salvucci h.a:.d formerly been an aide to Mayor Kevin White, and 
worked as a key liason with City Hall (Hollister, 1980, p.54). However, 
Dukak:is was upset by Edward King in the Democratic Gubernatorial Primary 
iri September, and King werit on to win the election. The lease signing 
date had been targeted for DeGember 15, but the prospect of a new adminis-
tration was potentially uns.ettling. 
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UIDC chose to continue working with the Dukakis administration, 
and marathon negotiation sessions were held in December. UIDC felt 
that working with a new set of state officials would delay the project 
at least one construction season (Lee, p.43). 
The points that held up the lease signing were affirmative action 
and t he ren t schedule. The State, as would the City, wanted assurances 
that at leas·t 25% of the construction jobs would go to minority residents. 
The rent schedule was complicated, and there wene misu"nderstandinga 
between the State and UIDC. 'lbe State comprimised with the affirmative 
action portion of the lease, decreasing from a required 25~ to 2CY'/o of 
the jobs to be minority. Howeve.r, the State refused to negotiate the rent 
subordination schedule (Hollister, 1980, p.43). The State, in fact, 
t hreatened to decline a lease agreement with UIDC , and advertise for a 
new developer. Given the impending termina tion of the Dukakis administra-
tion, the threat implied a.n ul.timatum of "deal with us, and know what you 
have; or wait for the new administration, and see what you might get." 
(note: The only State actor who would continue into the King adminis t ra-
tion , John Driscoll, Chairman of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 
did not play a major leadership role in any negotiations, according to 
Frank Keefe). 
In the end, the bargaining s~ssions were successful. The State and 
UIDC officially solidified their relationship at a lease signing ceremony 
on December 22~ · 1978~ The media proclaimed the event as the fitting 
last cha~ter in the Dukakis administration -- one that had such a strong 
policy for urban developement. Yet, "the largest connnercial development · 
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in state hi s tory" (Globe, 12/23/78 ), was not completed. In reality, it 
was just beginning. The state actors were finished with their major in-
volvement, and the City s tood ready to continue the negotiation process 
and to issue the necessary permits. 
Returning to t he de s ign process, the developer had revised the ori-
ginal 2-store/a-hotel scheme to a 3-store/1-hotel scheme, and finally, 
to a 1-store/2-hotel scheme. As these details were worked out by the 
architect, the CRC reconvened and began assessing the impacts in light 
of these changes (UIDC, 1980, p.9). Between February and November, 1979, 
CRC held 14 meetings to assess the impacts and re-examine the issues not 
adequately addressed intbe 1978 sessions. 
As a result of the CRC sessions, 2 new studies were commissioned 
by the BRA. The CRC determined that the housing and retail impacts 
needed to be studies further. A local consultant, Ma.rk Wal tch, was hired 
to advise the CRC on the analysis of the impacts (Hollister, 1980,p.41). 
Waltch helped the CRC to understand and critically review the analyses 
resulting from the BRA commiss ions(UIDC, 1980, p. 9). 
The newly completed studies were released at the end of 1979. The 
CRC taskforces on the housing and retail issues also released their own 
Swmnary Analyses. The CRC conclusions that were drawn resembled those of 
the BRA-commissioned studiesa the retail impact would be beneficial to 
existing area businesses by drawing larger numbers of shoppers into the 
vicinity {CRC, 1979); the housing in!pact would result in some displace-
ment (recognized as an ongoing national trend, however), but the addition 
of 100 units within Copley Place and the further impetus to develop the 
'\ 
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Tent City site, would work to counteract gentrificat~on (CRC, 1979). 
(note: Tent City is a 3.3 acre site adjacent to the Copley Place project 
which has been res identially vacant for over 15 years. The site earned 
its name in 1968 from squatters who lived thrare, in tents, to protest 
the City's lack of commitment to rebUilding low-income housing. The City 
argues that the site is non~assemblable. Two-thirds of the p11?oe .is owned 
privately, and is unavailable) 
In addition to revi ewing the updated retail and housing impact 
studies,ttie last CRC meetings held in 1979 included discussions about 
the city application for an Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG). The 
UDAG was required since the State did not agree to "subsidize" Copley 
Place with either a 121A tax abatement (a state approved proper ty tax 
abatement in liat of a set yearly fee, a concept designed originally for 
the Prudential Center), or a land cost relief. The developer had first 
expressed the need fo:r some form of public funding in the summer of 1978. 
'lbe necessity of applying public funds to co7er the exorbitant site pre-
pa,ration costs had been acknolrledged from the initial negotiations with 
the the State (UIDC, 1980, p.8). 
The l3RA agreed to apply for a UDAG and began the information pre-
paration process. Public input was sought by the city with regard to not 
only the UDAG application, but also th~ oth9r l'llblio approvals in the 
process. The BRA worked with1he CBC to outline a meeting format for the 
fjrst _pµblic U:PA_G hearing to be _held _on)fovember 19, 1979~ (Tw~ public 
hearings are required in the UDAG application process, one for pre-
applj oation input and the second for final application approval). 
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Before the meeting, background information waa mailed to all CRC membe:r·s 
and other interested organizations. At this point, it was hoped by CRC 
that the Tent City funding request o! $5 million could be tied into the 
Copley Place UDAG application. State Representative Mel King, from the 
Scuth End, saw the Copley Place UDAG as a chance to leTerage subsidized 
housing on the Tent City site (Boston Ledger, 4/18/80).' As a type of 
trade-off, the accelerated population change that would result from 
Copley Place would be nega. ted by giving the low-income persons a secure 
future in the area. 
'lbe meeting was held at 7:00 P.M. at the Boston Public Library. 
The meeting was chaired by William Holland, Director or the Mayor's Office 
of Public Service, and seated on the panel were Kenneth Himmel, Vice-
President of UIDC; Steven Eimer, Project Manager of Copley Place at UIDC; 
Richard Garver, Deputy Director of the BRA; Jeffrey Chmura, Project 
Coordinator of Copley Place at BRA; and George Bennett, Director of the 
Employment and Economic Policy Administration. The format of the meeting 
was set · and formalized in an opening statement by Holland, which was 
followed by introductory remarks given by Eimer, Garver, and Bennett. 
Testimony from the public was then requested. Thirty two persons spoke. 
The majority of the testimony was addressed to a linkage with Tent 
City. The feeling among many of the speakers was if there would be one 
UDAG, there should be two. It was seen as a way to combine city and 
federal goals or leveraging private investment with the community goals 
of low-income housing. (note: A UDAG may be used for low-income housing) 
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Those who spoke against Tent City ai·gued that it misnt serve to jeo-
pardize the success of Copley Place. Although Tent City was not directly 
the subject of the hearing, the mood of the meeting was set by the 
~motional issue (UDAG Testimony, 1979). 
Others who testified spoke to the question of the extent of social 
impacts of Copley Place. The residents of the South End, testifying on 
behalf of their neighborhood,e~horted the city to consider and mitigate 
the harmful effects of Copley Place. Ralph Jordan, a resident and fonner 
Chairperson of the CRC Task Force on Community Economic Development, noted 
that, "when public funds are used on a large scale to assist a private 
developer, those funds must be used to the greatest extent possible to 
provide jobs and other economic opportunities to economically disadvan-
taged citizens, particularly those whose own lives and lives of family 
and friends are so greatly affected by this development. The City must 
provide leadership to prove to all those living in the City that it 
cares, and that the Mayor will m~e sure the peaple of Boston get their 
fair share" (UDAG Testimony, 11/19j79, p.72). 
The Cit,y had made it clear earlier that the UDAG would not be 
100i~ erant money. The developer initially a·sked for an outright grant, 
but the City took the position of requiring a return of a portion of the 
money, according to a BRA spokesperson (Dick Garver, 11/19/79). The 
developer needed the entire sum immediately, but later, after the con-
struction would be completed and prC'fits from the operation would begin, 
the developer could afford to repay the loan with interest. The terms of 
the repayment amount and schedule were not known at the time of the 
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November meeting, but were in the proaess of negotiation. It had been 
anticipated that the terms ~ould be worked out and a UDAG written by the 
January 31, 1980 deadline for applications. However, the repayment sche-
dule and the jobs issue became the fo cal points for BRA - UIDC nego-
tiations during t he ensuing months. 
While the UDAG negotiations and design development continued, the 
State amended its lease agreement with the developer. Since the Copley 
Place program had changed in composition during the summer of 1979 
(:the reductiDn of retail and department store space and the increase of 
hotel and office space), the MTA revised its rent payment schedule. The 
Air R).ghts Lease of December, 1978 was amended with the new f.inancial 
terms on January 31, 1979 (UIDC, 1980, p.10). The new lease was signed 
by UIDC Chairman Thomas Klutznick, the new C-overnor, Edward King, and 
MTA Chairman John Driscoll. The affirmative action requirements were 
unchanged, and the CRC process was extended to ihe end of May, 1980 
(unx:, 1980, p.11). 
The foeus of the winter of 1979 and the early spring of 1980 was 
the UDAG application. The BEA and the developer put concerted effort 
into working out the detadls. Described as an"iterative process" by 
Lucas DiLeo, Project Coordinator of Copley Place for the BRA, the nego-
tiations were a continual interacition between the :BRA and UIDC. The 
legal, financial, design, neighborhood impact, employment, and environ-
mental issues were all' intertwihed in the UDAG discussion. By April, the 
negotiation centered around two major areas of the application: (1) the 
financial terms of the UDAG - the total amount, the ratio of loan to grant, 
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the method of repayment of the loan portion, and the basic terms of the 
business agreement; and, (2) the affirmative ac tion guidelines to be 
followed both for jobs and minori ty contr acts during construction and for 
the ~ermanent emploTilent opportunities (UIDC, 1980, p.11). 
The financial tenns were wo~ked out early in the month (Globe, 
4/10/80). The amount of the UDAG was set at $18.8 million, $3.8 million 
of which would be ~ grant to the project, and $15 million of which would 
constitute the loan. The repayment of the loan, which won't begin until 
1984 or 85, will amount to $42 million over the 21-year life of the 
loan. The monies collected will be put int o a Neighborhood Development 
Fund to be supervised by the City Council. The interest rate for repayment 
was set at 1CY/6, when the current mortgage rate was 13% at a commercial 
bank. 
The payback represents an innovative measure in the unAG for Copley 
Place. The Mayor had issued an Executive Order in 1979 regarding the 
creation of a neighborhood develop~ant fund as a symbol of the city's 
desire to make sure that the economic benefits resulting from private 
investment in the City are not allowed to escape from it. The BRA, from 
the beginning, committed itself to using the recycled federal monies in 
the impact areas of Copley Place. At a time when the effects of Copley 
Place would begin to be felt, the money from the payback could be used 
to help mitigate displacement and assist low-income housing (UDAG Testi-
mony, 11/19/79, p.18). Also, the BRA mentioned use of the payback to help 
coI:llllUility businesses start up operation in the neighborhood retail section 
of the r,opley Place development. 
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The CRC held a meeting on Apr il 14, 1980 to review the UDAG application. 
In preparation for the second of the two required UDAG public hearings, 
to be held t he following day, the CRC members considered all the sections 
of the application except those referring to the jobs agreement, which 
was yet unresolved. The April 15 meeting was a City Council Committee 
hearing. The Council Committee on Planning and Develoiinant reviews all 
draft UDAG applications, taking testimony from the public, the applicant 
BRA, and the developer. 
Thirty per sons testified at the meeting, including r esidents of 
the South End, bus iness leaders, and construction workers, who were con-
cer ned a.bout th e jobs issue. As with the November public hearing, the 
Tent City issue was raised. However, the meeting's consensus was one of 
qualified support of the UDAG pending final ratification of the jobs 
issue (UDAG Tes t i mony, 4/15/80). The construction workers, while pleased 
with the prospect of employment, feared that the stringent resident 
requirements wo~1ld jeopardize jobs for the ailing industry (Globe, 4/16/80). 
As Teri Weidner, spokesperson for UIDC, observed, the heavy steelworkers 
are not from the city of Boston - many are not even resident~ of the 
State. Union3 will not allow the unqualified to work, so the developer 
voiced concern over strict residency requirements as well at subsequent 
UDAG hearings on April 28 and 29. 
The deadline for application was April 30. The adamant stance 
. . . . -
taken by the City and 11itched by Mayor vn1i te was jobs for residen+.s. 
Affirmative ac tion guidelines were included in the MTA lease, as mentioned 
previously, but ·the City was holding out for residency. \ofhite, in a press 
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conference, told reporters, "I want this project in Boston. But I also 
want 50;~ of the jobs from the project to go to Bostonians. I feel strongly 
about this issue, a:nd we are negotiating now. It is an obstacle which 
could jeopardize the future of the Copley Place project" (Herald American, 
4/10/so). 
The newspapers followed the pr ogress of, the negotiations throughout 
the last week of April. 'Ihe consensus seemed to be that everyone wanted 
f 
the project, but with that important "if." Th~ developer argued that the 
! 
I 
a f fi rmative action requirements set in the Air Rights Lease were prece-
dent-setting, and strict enough. UIDC ~ould only try to meet percentage 
goa.ls for permanent jobs , and could not meet those percentages for con-
struction jobs because of a challenge by ihe construction industry that 
was then in court (Weidner interview). The construction industry had 
brought Sl_lit against the City in challenge to -Mayor White's Executive 
Order requi£ing 50'/J of construction jobs be given to residents. ur:rx; did 
not want to be caught in the middle of the legal battle, and preferred 
. 
to sidestep the requirements, and specify goals instead. It was that 
difference between the developer's goals and the city's requirements 
that was the difference between aiming at a target and hitting it. 
· According to an analysis of the negotiations printed in the Boston 
Ledger, the jobs agreement hold-up was making everyone unhappy (Ledger, 
Week of 4/18-24/80). UIDC was unhappy because it wanted to make the April 
30 UDAG deadline to avoid another 3-month dea.ly in the project,'s ground-
breaking (UDAGs are awarded .quarterly). The communtty was unhappy because 
they were exciuded from the negotiation, and could only testify at infre-
quent public hearings. The BRA was unhappy because it feared another 
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"Zuckerman" (Zuckerman was the developer who walked out of the Park 
Plaza project about which the City was so sensitive), and because the 
a gency was caught between the developer, the mayor, the legal challenge, 
and the community residents. 
The public hear ings held on April 28 and 29, at sessions of the 
Council Committeeon Planning and Development were emotion filled. The 
11th hour nego tiations caused some complaint from those who felt that 
they did no t have adequate time to review the final UDAG application 
(Globe, 4/29/80 ). Councilman Ray Fl ynn blamed the lack of time on the :B"?.A , 
and on the day before t he submission deadline, he threatened to vote 
against the application in order to fully review the terms (Globe, 4/29/80). 
The Committee reported out the Application on the evening of 
April 29. The final application had several amendments attached pertaining 
to the jobs agreement and the financing schedule. The application was 
sent t o the full City Council for consideration o~ the 30th. The jobs 
agreement, was decided as goals for hiring residents, rather than the 
requirements. The hiring goals for construction call for 5<:r;6 of the 
jobs for J3oston residents , 35;~ for minorities, and 1076 for women. The 
Attainment of the goals would be monitored by a committee composed of 
union and contractor i nterests. The only requirements were those pertainipg 
to affirmative a.ction, already agreed upon in the Air Rights Lease. 
The agreement set goals of hiring Boston residents for 5o:ifo of the 
6000 permanent jobs resulting from the project. The developeD ·agreed to 
encourag-e future tenants to abide by these goals, which include 5076 of 
\ 
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jobs for women and 30% for minority. Detaib on enforcing the goals 
were not arranged at the time of the UDAG application. Instead, it was 
decided that Mayor White would meet with the major tenants and work out 
individual agreements. According to Robert Ryan, Director of the BRA, 
the jobs agreements "will reach the City's goals" (Globe, 4/29/80). 
On April 309 "!;he ful l Council unanimously approved the UDAG appli-
cation on the recommendation of the Committee on Planning and Develope~ent. 
Several councilmen, while voting affirmatively for the UDAG, voiced 
reservations concerning the project. Councilman John Sears expressed 
dissatisfaction with the design and environmental issues. Councilman 
Ray Flynn brought up the Tent City issue, in concert with State Repre-
sentative Mel King, in a statement vowing to "sink the project" if the 
BRA did not follow through with assurances that Tent City would be 
developed. The BRA made a commitment to build subsidized housing on 
the site, and indicated that HUD would look favorably on an application 
for federal funds to make Tent City work (Globe, 4/30/80). 
The problem for the developer at this point was project financing. 
The City submitted the UDAG contingent upon the provision of information 
pertaining to financing (UIDC, 1980, P.13). The lack of this information 
resulted in a postponement of HUD review until the next funding period 
deadline, June 30. 
During May and June, UIDC devoted its full attention to bringing 
project feasibility to a level tmt would allow for the necessary presen-
tations to permanent lenders. UIDC could not secure the bulk of its 
financing because of incomplete design development and environmental 
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impact studies, unresolve.d arch! tectural and engineerir 1;ork, and 
outstanding permits and approvals from the City (UIDC, 1980, p.13). 
Again, however, the developer was unable to supply the necessary financing 
information to HUD by the deadline, and petitioned HUD for another delay, 
until September 30. 
By mid-August, UIDC had secured the financial commitments needed 
for the UDAG review. Financing for the project is arranged by Morgan 
Guaranty Trust Company of New York, the First National Bank of Chicago, 
and Citibank, N.A. of New York. The investment capital is provided for 
by the above lead banks and the First National Bank of Boston, Security 
Pacific National Bank of Los Angeles, and Seattle First National Bank 
(UIDC, 1981). The financial arrangements were written into the UDAG 
application, which was considered by HUD on September 30, 1980. 
An administrative complaint was filed on June 5 by several com-
munity groups to protest the UDAG application. The complaint, filed with 
HUD, claimed that: 1) Bos ton was not eligible for UDAG funds (based on 
litigation regarding the segregated characteristics of Boston's housing 
policies); 2) Copley Place did not require a UDAG subsidy (UIDC has 
assets totaling $1 billion); and, 3) negative environmental impacts, 
and displacement will result from the project (Administrative Complaint, 
1980). 
The BRA began preparation of a response to 1he complaint, and filed 
a rebuttal on August 11. The response addressed each issue in detail, 
ani defended the project as one that would "leverage substantial private 
investment to the direct and indirect benefit of low-and moderate-
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income people, especially members of minority groups" (BRA, 1980, p.iv). 
At UIDC, the design development process was the summer's activity. 
By July, 1980, the design was complete, containing ihe same mix of uses, 
the same elements, and the same layout as had been defined in the UDAG 
and the Draft EIR/EIS (note: the Draft EIR/EIS was submitted to the State 
in Febraary, 1980, and was considered at a public hearing in March, 
1980). The detailed design was a bit larger, however, increasing appro~­
imately 7% (UIDC, 1980, p.14). 
Three separate design reviews were required for final approval. 
Held during July and August, the reviews were conducted by the BRA, 
representing the City; the Massachusetts gistorical Commission, holding 
a 106 review of the development's impact on the abutting South End His-
torical District, and the CRC Design Review Subcommittee (DRSC), upon 
whose recommendation the MTA would rely for their decision, representing 
the State (UIDC, 1980~ p.14). 
~e DRSC completed review of the design an~made their recom-
mendations to the full CRC and the MTA officials on September 24, 1980. 
They raised Objections concerning several of the architectural features 
of the project, including the use of large areas of synthetic materials 
on blank walls, the lack of relation to the surrounding area, and the 
apparent di~couragement of pedestrian use of the complex (Globe, 10/3/80). 
Other points raised by the DRSC relate to the expected environmental 
problems such as high winds and shadows across Copley Square. However, 
the MTA ignored the DRSC concerns, mid gave unqualified approval to the 
final design (Globe, 10/3/80). 
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1'he B::tA gave appr oval to the s chematic design on September 22, 
1980, but reserved final approval on "numerous design issues • . •• not. 
fully resolved to date between the City and UIDC" (BRA, 9/22/80). The 
BRA listed nine open design items to be negotiated, and reserved the 
right to withhold UDAG money until the issues are resolved. 
• • 
The Mas sachusetts Historical Commission (MHC) gave qualified 
approval to the design in the 106 review procedure. The MHC's role in 
the review is to evaluate the desiBD of Copley Place in relation to the 
surrounding historic structures (the Boston Public Library, i:he Trinity 
Church and the South End brownstones.). The Commission has agreed tothe 
overall de sign but is involved in an ongoing review of the more detailed 
design elements as they a r e amended (Joseph Orphant interview). 
With most of the s teps either completed or underway, UIDC waited 
for the UDAG approval. Construction of the project was contingent upon 
the Federal money to perform the necessary site preparation work. As 
anticipated, the UDAG was approved on October 2, 1980, clearing one of 
the last major hurdles for project realization. The announcement of the 
approval came through Senator Edward Kennedy's office (D-Massachusetts), 
signaling the largest amount for a single UDAG in the history of the 
program. 
The only matter unresolved was the transfer of land between the 
City and the MTA. Two parcels of city-owned land were to be transferred 
in order to enable UIDC to move Stuart Street slightly south and 
enlarge a triangular parcel on which one of the hotels is to be built 
(Globe, 11/6/80). The City Council gave approval to the land transfer on 
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November 5, which allowed UI:DC to schedule groundbreaking ceremonies. 
Councilman Sears, voicing concerns shared by the defunct DRSC, warned 
that the project did not promote pedestrian access. He had submitted 
an amendment tot he land transfer legislation requiring that a sidewalk 
be built along the new Stuart Street. The amendment also called for 
reactivization of the DRSC. 
The MTA had threatened to revoke the lease and withold the site if 
the sidewalk were required. The sidewalk would cr oss at the turnpike 
exit ramp and would result in traffic problems, according to MTA Chairman 
Driscoll (Globe, 11/6/80). The renewal of the D~SC was ieft as an amendment 
to the land transfer, but the City Council then passed a separate resolu-
tion that stated that the citizen design review function had been met. 
The BRA had met with "concerned citizens" on November 3, 1980 to discuss 
the design. 
One week later, UIDC held the official groundbreaking of Copley 
Place. On November 13, 1980, over 400 people listened as guestspeak:ers 
heralded t he historic event. The featured speakers were Thomas Klutznick, 
Chairman of the "Board of UIDC, Governor King, Mayor White, and MTA 
Chai rman Driscoll . Reference was made to t~e benef its that would result 
from Co~ley Place, including the tax benefits (the 121A request had 
been denied) and t he job crea.tion. The State and local tax revenues 
will runount to $27 million per year, and the payroll for the permanent 
jobs will be $96 million, in 1979 dollars (Weidner interview). 
~be remaining issues that complicate Copley Place are the law-
32 
suit brought by eight South End residmts andihe unresolved design 
elements. Both issues are delaying the transfer of the UDAG money from 
the City to urnc. 
The resolution of the lawsuit is undetermined. U.S. District 
Court Judge Andrew Cafferty refused to dismiss the case after a motion 
for summa.27 judgement was filed by HUD. In so doing, Judge Cafferty 
stated that HUD failed to establish that it had the "relevant racial 
and socio-economic .information" it needed at the time of the UDAG review 
(Memorandum, 8/17/81). A trial date has not yet been set, although a 
date is expected to be announced sometime in May, 1982. 
The unresolved design issues hoLding the tr.DAG funds (received by 
the BRA in May, 1981) were outlined in the preliminary approval of 
September 22, 1980. Of the nine points stated, five have been resolved 
(DiLeo intsrvi.ew). The remaining issues concern the blank wall, the 
design of the housing component, the entrance to the community retail 
space, and the nature of the plaza on Stuart Street. According to Teri 
Weidner, the design process is expected to be long and involved. The 
fine r detail matte~s that remain unresolved do not affect the construction · 
s chedule. Construction work is continuing at the Copley Place site, 
giving the impression that UIDC is confident that the outcome of the 
lawsuit and the design issues will be positive. 
'lbe future for Copley Place, after five yea.rs of negotiation between 
all levels of government, community, and private interests, is uncertain. 
As the process continues, cost estimates have mushroomed from the 
original estimate of ~295 million to the current figure of $400 million. 
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v. Analyi:; i s a.nd r.onclusion 
The Copley Place project is underway; the construction Achedule 
is being followed, and an opening date of 1984 is anticipated. A full 
evaluation of project success is not possible until completion of the 
construction phase and start up of operation. However, for the most part, 
the negotiations process which set the stage for implementation of the 
project is completed- (except for the unresolved design issues). A pre-
liminary assessment of the public sector role in the process can be made. 
The State, the first public sector actor/negotiator, had the ulti-
mate card in its hand to leverage and shape the type of private inveest-
ment p·roposed by UIDC - o1'1nership of the strategically situated land. 
U!DC could not complete any project without a parcel in a prime location 
on which to build. From the initial stages of negotiation, the State 
could threaten to wit~old the land in order to design the project to 
maximum public benefit. The crucial decision to lease the parcel rather 
than sell guaranteed state leverage up to the signing of a lease agreement. 
Frank Keefe, in reflecting on the State's role in the negotiating 
' process, emphasized the advantage df state ownership and the notion of 
leasing the property. He states that, "The economics worked to our 
advantage. We were able to talk with the developer in terms of phasing 
the rent payments. As a result of escalating the rent payments over time, 
the developer did not have to capitalize his purchase of the land ~·· We 
were able in the bar.gaining to say to them, 'Look, you don't have to take 
down the land from Day One'" (Hollister, 1980, p.53). A mutually beneficial 
"deal" was worked out. The State and City gained a major, tax producing 
develo-pmen t ; ~JIDC gained the opportunity to construct an enoti11ously 
i 
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profitable pr oject. 
The State completed its role in the negotiations in December of 
1978, but the Copley Place groundbreaking did not occur for another 
2 years. The public sector actor/negotiator during this second phase 
was the City of Boston, represented by the BRA. The assessment of the 
second phase entails the actual implementation of the project (the 
entering into the construction phase), the financing, and the final 
design development. What role did the BHA play? How did it choose to 
appr oach the negotiating table? How did the BF.A become involved? 
The City was a passive participant early in .the negotiations. 
Two reasons exist for this ''wait and see" attitude. The first reason is 
that technically the City was not involved in the process at that point. 
UIDC needed to secure a parcel before continuing with the part of the 
development process that would involve the City in a more active way 
the per.nit approval procedure. The second reason is more political, 
dealing with personalities and individual loyalties. When UIDC ini-
tially approached the State with the idea of Copley Place, they were 
associated with the Great Bay Company, a development firm started by 
J)D.n Gifford. Gifford formed a joint venture with UID0 to develop Cop~ y 
Place, and acted as their .local agent in the early months of the process. 
Mayor White had dealt with Gifford befere, in connection with the Park 
Plaza fiasco. Gifford represented a development firm other than the one 
chosen, the firm owned by Mort Zuckerman - White's personal friend. 
White withheld the City's. support of Copley Place as long as Gifford 
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was involved. On a visit to UIDC's Chicago ·development, Water Tower 
Place, White let it be known "that Gifford's connection with the pro-
ject would not help it secure the necessary approvals from the city" 
(Hollister, 1980, p.40). 
A related factor to the Mayor's initial cold shoulder is found 
in his friendship with Zuckerman. As mentioned earlier, both the city 
and the state were sensitive to the failure of Park Plaza just a couple 
of years earlier. However, Zucke:rinan blamed the prospect of Copley Place 
being built and the state's open-a:rin attitude toward UIDC for problems 
he experienced with his Park Plaza proposal. The Copley Place proposal 
and its Westin Hotel represented competition to his development (Sollimter, 
1980, p.40) • .WhH'l, out of loyalty to his friend, echoed Zuckerman's view, 
and kept a distance from Copley Place (Keefe interview). 
However, when Gifford was no longer associated with the project, 
and Zuckerman's feelings were sufficiently healed, White authorized 
more active involvement in the process. According to Keefe, the city 
sent observers only to the early CRC meetins as pass1ve representatives 
of its interests. However, with Gifford gone in early 1978, Robert Ryan, 
Director of the BP.A, became directly i nvolved. At this point, Keefe said 
that White wanted r.opley Place to succeed for the city. Politically, 
White had been on the losing end of two major develop:ruants in Boston: 
the Charlestown Navy Yard project, against which White fought, was 
implementtl anyway; the Park Plaza developme.nt, for which White . was a 
vigorous supporter, bad failed. Keefe said, "Copley was to be Kevin's 
(White's) success. " (Keefe interview). 
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The BRA's active participation began after the MTA signed the 
Air RJght's Lease with UI:rx::. With Dukakis administrati~n actors, Keefe 
and Salvucci, out of the picture (due to the King victory), the only 
remaining stat e actor was John Driscoll, Chairman of the MTA. His 
term overlapped the administrations. · According to· the BRA Project Coor-
dinator of Copley Pl ace, Lucas DiLeo, there was a leadership role which 
Driscoll did not fill. The city filled the void and took up the leader-
ship role enthusiastically. Ryan, ERA Director, speaks of the agency as 
"shifting away from its 160's and 70's main role of directing and chan-
neling heavy public investments into the city in order to encourage tax 
yielding private investment, to a role as manager of the pending private 
investments, as financial analysts in determining whether the city would 
even want or need future building investment, and attempting to further 
strengthen its role as a city planning agency" (Globe, 1/11/81). The 
BRA was ready to be a manager of Copley Place. 
The City came to t he negotiating table wanting a number of goals 
achieved. Primarily, the City wanted revenues and jobs for residents. 
The City also was looking for hotels to help promote tourism and convention 
business in Boston. Also, the uniqueness of Copley Place - the mixed-use, 
innovatively designed structure - was appealing (Lewis interview). The 
BHA sew the site as barren and underutilized; paying no taxes; providing 
no jobs; offering no housing, shopping or other services. The Copley 
Place project, with millions of private investment dollars, would 




The BRA saw a great opportunity to realize these objectives. 
In order to achieve the goals mentioned above, the City employed 
the leverage tools available to them - the UDAG and the design review 
proces~. The BRA used these to monitor the Copley Place program devel-
o~ment for benefits to the City. To f acilitate the pe=mit approval 
processeR that were necessary, the BRA provided guidance to UIDC in 
working with the various city agencies (Lewis interview). Rather than 
throwing up red flags, the BRA exercised a little more cooperation in the 
process. The priority in approving the development program was speed to 
accomodate the developer's schedule - but always with the City's interests. 
The BRA could have slowed each step, losing direction in a bureaucratic 
quagmire typical of some public-private ventures. The tactic employed 
instead kept negotiations more open. 
Nevertheless, how crucial the presence of the BRA was in the 
planning of the Copley Place project is open to sane discussion. Keefe, 
the State Planner who led negotiations up to the lease slgning, feels 
that the City had no significant impact on the shape or form of Copley 
Place (Keefe interview). The critical planning issues were decided 
before the BRA crune into play. Copley Place, "probably the most success-
ful planning project in Boston", according to Keefe, was settled by the 
state participants. 
The only legitimate objective that the city had was "seeing the 
project through," continued Keefe. The urban design and community issues 
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were resolved: the EIR/ElS process was at the state level (until federal 
funds became involved, at which time a federal EIS was necessary), and 
the CRC was a state-sponsered entity. The CRC function ended in May 1979 
in .accordance with their contract with the MTA. 
Keefe said that in t he beginning of the process, there was no 
flak regarding the development. The problems between the public and 
private interests came later with t he inclusion of Tent City as. an issue 
and the UDAG application. However, politically aware, the state tried 
"to make it Kevin's (White's) project from the beginning, so he wouldn't 
sabotage it later on" (Keefe interview). The BRA, riding on the coattails 
of th~ state's planning and negotiation, was able to embrace a success 
story and appear to make i t its own, continued Keefe. 
Whether or not Keefe is correct in his opinions of the BRA's role 
in shaping Copley Place, the BRA role as UDAG applicant cannot be dis-
regarded. The BRA was abl~ to negotiate with UID~ over social issues of 
employment opportunity and housing. As presented ear lier, Ylhite was 
clear during t he UDAG talks that he stood behind a policy of benefits 
for residents. Tne UTIAG money was necessary for project completion, and 
the BP.A used that fact as a lever in the beginning of terms. 
The UDAG application process gave the city the opportunity to achieve 
its goals for Boston residents. With public financial subsidy, public 
benefit must follow. The UDAG program requires that a project benefits 
low income groups, and the application provided both a way to secure more 
mogs - and more importantly, a way to finance future neighborhood invest.:-
ment. The City used the UDAG to go beyond the immediate boundaries of 
' 
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the Copley Pla~e :.ite, as the benefits resulting from the project will 
be city-wide. The city has documented, with independent consulting 
studies to confirm, .that eny negative impacts resulting from the project 
are outweighed by the positive. To mitigate the negative impacts, the 
city intends to utilize funds created from the UDAG itself, accrued from 
the ur:rx:: loon payba~k. 
The presence of the payback fund is a key to HUD's approval of 
the UDAG, says Frank Smizik, lawyer for the South End residents suing 
HUD. He feels that RUD was not convinced that UID'J needed the money for 
project feasibility, but that a payback of $15 million of the UDAG, with 
interest, seemed to justify the proposal (Smizik interview). The leverage 
of private monies with the ~ublic dollars was a 15:1 ratio at the time of 
the application. UDAG guidelines specify only a 5: or 6:1 ratio as neces-
sary. The tremendous difference could be indicative of UI:rx:: not really 
needing such a comparatively small amount, or it could be indicative of 
needing that money as a seed to leverage the remainder of private financing. 
In any event, the payback was a sweetner in the decision - for the 
BP.A as well. The prospect of $42 million over the next 25 odd years is 
strong incentive to apply for a federal grant. The BRA realizes, along 
with everyone else, that the future of massive federal subsidy is uncer-
tain with the Reagan administration and the economic downturn. The 
Copley Place UDAG provides public investment capital for the future so 
that Boston does not have to rely exclusively on unpredictable yea~ to 
year support. 




The good intentions detailed in the Copley Place UDAG defense may or not 
come to realization. Smizik, in outlining justification for his client's 
case, fears that the fund will be used to finance more job creation 
for the professional (Smizik interview). 'Ihe BRA used 11fallaci9us 
reasoning" and disregarded some of 11 the facts and figures" in their 
defense of the UDAG. In order to promote jobs, the BRA glossed over the 
real housing issues such as displacement. He feels that the same will 
occur in the future when considering projects to fund. The problem is 
based upon the fact that the BRA has contact with developers rather than 
the community (Smizik interv ie\.f ). 
Residents of the South End illlJ)act a r eas voiced their opinion of 
the lTDAG at the public hearings held during the application approval 
process. Kenneth Campbell, resident and member of the Ellis Neighborhood 
Association, asked "whether we should subsidize a profit-making commer-
cial developnent in order that it can build a v:ery large project that 
will help disintegrate the multi-racial, multi-class, multi-ethnic 
neighborhood" (Testimony, 1979, p.38). Bill Abbott, resident, stated 
that giving $18.8 million to this project is "an example of socialism 
for the rich and an example· of nothing for everybody else" (Testimony. 
1979, p.164). 
These allegations are not at this point proven. The views held by 
Smizik and the South End residents he represents will be considered in 
a court of law. Yet, the fact that the BRA used the UDAG as a means to 
create the neighborhood fund is undisputed. The effectiveness of ihe 
fund in overcoming what the BRA refers to as "natural demographic changes" 
'\ 
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rather than displacement, will be determined at some future date (BRA, 
1980, p.ii). A judgement now would be premature. 
The use of the UDAG as a leveraging tool for jobs was a second 
example of bargaining for public benefit. Disregarding for a moment 
that strong affirmative action provisions for construction were already 
included in the MTA lease, the city did attE!llpt to extend the provisions 
to permanent jobs. The Boston Globe editorialized that "it is a sign of 
the city's strength that it is able to negotiate wlth a major developer 
on allied questions relating to the creation of job opportunities for 
Boston residents" (Globe, 4/30/80). The White administration was success-
ful in a 507·6 resident job agreement with a high technology firm Teradyne, 
Inc. moving into Boston (with the leverage of a federal grant) earlier 
in 1930. The Copley Place agreement would be commercial rather than 
industrial developl!ent, and would set a precedent for resident-jobs 
agreement for future development of that type. 
Unfortunately, the city was unable to secure guaranteed resident 
jobs. The agreement settled upon in ihe UDAG outlines goals rather than 
required quotas. The permanent job provisions are vague. For one resident, 
Copley Place is no different than other developments that promise jobs to 
the neighborhood: "They said jobs. They said jobs - the Prudential. You 
big f!JJ.YS been talkin' about jobs for so long ain't nobody gonna believe 
you anymore" (UDAG Testimony, 1~79, p.150). 
, The jobs issue was, as Weidner of UIDC referred to it, a ''hang up 
with the city." She holds that the affinnative action guidelines in the 
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MTA lease, for construction, are unprecedented, and in fact exceeded 
those called for by the city. The MTA lease requires 2CY'~ jobs for 
minorities during construction, while the UDAG agreements merely set 
goals. Compliance with the requirements is monitored by the MTA; the 
attaimnent of the goals set by the city would be monitored by a 
committee of es t e.blished contractor and union interests. The Boston Jobs 
Coe.l i tion, the pr incipal advocate of resident-jobs, is excluded from 
the oversight committee. Therefore, the committee's composition is 
questionable. 
Keefe, in reflecting on the MTA lease said that the affirmative 
action requirements are "revolutionary" (Keefe interview). The lease 
tenns provide for a recruitment office and review mechanism. He feels 
that the city tried to make the jobs agreements their own, and attmepted 
to retrace the state's steps to replicate an agreement for the city's 
personal credit. Nevertheless, jobs will be created in great number, and 
if the goals are met, they will aggregate 2034 tor low and moderate 
income, 1261 for CETA - eligibles, and 1512 for minorities, as specified 
in the UDAG agreement (signed by Mayor White 2/24/81). 
Heralding the Copley Place development, Mayor White claimed that 
"the terms of this grant provide a national model for building a financial 
bridge between the downtown and the neighborhood. This model assures that 
future downtown development will benefit this city's neighborhoods, both 
directly in terms of jobs for our people and indirectly through the 
money which will be funnelled into the Neighborhood Development Fund" 
(Globe, 4/10/80). To the outside observer, the project appears to be 
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successful. As opposed to Park Plaza, the city reached an agreement with 
the developer in just two years. For the most part, the project succeeded 
in accomodating the conflicting goals of numerous participants in the 
process. The design components include low-income housing and oommunity 
retail snace; the construction phase guarantees jobs for minorities; 
goals have been set to target permanent jobs to residents; over $40 million 
will be returned to the city through the loan payback; the city will 
receive at loo.st f7 million annually in tax revenues; and finally, UIDC · 
will own one of the most unique downtown development projects in the 
country. 
The "vibrant urban resource" being created at Copley Place will 
have both positive and negative impacts. Not everyone will be satisfied 
with the end result, but the benefits for the city will extend beyond the 
boundaries of the site. That a developemnt of its size would be ventured 
in :Boston is a credit to the ability of the city to accept and work with 
the private sector. The outlook for :Boston's bu1lding expansion is good; 
according to a Globe article, the city is "in the midst of a $1 billion 
construction boom which will extend into 1982 and 1983 and beyond" (Globe, 
1/11/81). The city, working though the BRA, has committed itsdf to 
approving development based on what it "has to offer in terms of maximum 
job opportunities for Boston residents and in terms of minimizing local 
public investment, and in gaining agreements with builders to conform to 
city planning strategies aimed at channeling building investment into 
those areas the planners feel need the benefits of new construction, even 
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though the ~evelopers would rather build in the downtown financial area 
only" (Globe, 1/11/81 ). 
The problem for the city and the BRA is to make certain that these 
"city planning strategies" do not ignore the vitality of the neighbor-
hocds. The rhetoric of a financial bridge between the downtown and the 
neighbor· oods must :ass the press conference stage and move into imple-
mentation. The Neighborhood Development Fund and jobs created by Copley 
Place proviea real economic justification for pursuing a downtown develop-
ment policy. 
The key to the success of the doW!ltown building boom and the massive 
infusion of private dollars is a mental climate that respects private 
uea.lth and a.tt:raets it iote :projects that will benefit the people of 
Boston. As said by John Ryan, former member of the ''Boston Planning 
Board," (sic), "The human links that this development (Copley Place) 
proposes and that this development can accomplish for linking neigh-
borhoods is a very significant part of joining important neighborhoods 
in Boston. This project will close scars left by construction of the 
Turnpike Extension 15 years ago and will provide the city with tax 
revenue and economic activity where neither exists now. The role of the 
city is properly in place here in supporting investment both on a city 
and the state and federal level ... .. to benefit the city on the whole" 
(Testimony, 1979, p.88). 
The benefits gained from any project as massive as Copley Place; 
the impacts felt by the numbers of people nearby; the physical alteration 
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to the geographic area - these circumstances will be far reaching for 
Boston and the metropolitan area. For as many persons who support Copley 
Place, there are as many who discount its value. ''Large scale development 
is a two-edged sword" (Globe, 10/15/80). A judgement as to the absolute 
success or failure of Copley Place and the role of the public sector in 
the implementation of the project is reserved for analysis at another 
time. But what can be learned is the complexity of public-private devel-
opment ventures, an.d .the availability of leveraging tools to guide and 
shape investment to ~ublic benefit. 
Economic growth, devoi d of economic development poli cies, does not 
help the r.ommunity. Ho~ever, when a public agency intervenes to shape 
and expand its "' Cope to embrace a broe.der social context, as the BRA did 
with Copley Place, urba.n economic policy implementation begi ns to dull toe 
sharp edge of the aevelopment sword. The innovative techniques exercised 
by the BRA may or may not prove to be the most beneficial to each resident 
of Boston, but they go a long way in the attempt to ensure that victims 
of economic growth are not too badly injured. 
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vi ::: On April 18, th~ Massachusetts TuFnpike Authority entered into a six-ll'Dn.th ::: 
g ::: Memrandum of Unders tandil}g (M.O. U.) with Great Bay Co. and Urban Inves txrent and De·1- - ::: 
~ ::: velopment Company (UIDC) during which Great Bay Co. and UIDC will ".lgage in engineer- ;:; 
ro ::: ing and market analyses .ind the Turnpike Authority will refuse to negotiate or lea5e ::: 
::: its Copley Square land and air rights to any other party. A 60-j.sy period beyond the ::: 
g :;: six months is provided in which Great Bay Co., UIOC, and the Turnpike Authcrity must ;:: 
~ ::: execute an option agreement.. If no such agreement is reached, the obligations of the ::: 
ro ··: Ur\u rmi ·" 
"< =:· nu te na te. ::: 
" ::: ::: 
Q;" ::: In order to guarantee that the bes t interests of the Commonweal th, City, and ::: 
g ::: the adjacent neighborhoods are served, the Governor has asked that the Develclp1:1ent :;: 
n ::: Cabinet take the lead role during the six-nxmth analysis in evaluating environmental ::: 
-;; ::: constraints and community desires. 1he Office of State Planning wil~ coordinate the ::: 




:;: borhood groups and city offJcials are integrated into both <lesig11 and environmental :;: 
'.:: studies. The Turnpike Authocit:; will '2 nter irlto rnnr.racts for ,·o ns ultant services to ::: 
:::i::i ::; be available to the Development C::ibinet and U!c Ci t izens Ad'."isory S r0uµ or. design, en- ::; 
~ ::: vironmental, and connnuni ty issues. ::: 
-· ·=· ·=· \"t :·: :-: ~ :;: At the end of six months, ev.::ryone 1.'ill h.'.l v~ a full understanding 01 the ccn- :;: 
~ ::: strain ts and opportunitiP.s at Copley Squan: . ,! nil a decision can be made by b •) th the :;: 
~ ::: developer and the state a nd the ci t y pub.lie sector agencies as t «' whether it makes ;:; 
~· ::: sense to proceed into an option. ::: 
. . (ti' :·: : ·: 
ro ::; 'This decision-making ;Hocess is rl!fl~ctive of the Jesire of state and city :~: 
: ::; governmt:?nt to work directly and cooper;1tivcly \..'i th an interested d0veloper of proven ;:: 
:! ::: record on a site with signif icanc: development imp(: dime nts while l!nsuring full and ::: 
~ ;:; active participation by public agencies and Ct'n:munity t:roups to promote an appropriate :;: 
::: and acceptable project. ::: . 
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Citizen~ Review Committee 
List of Meetings 
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Legal and Traffic Issues 
Physical Constraints 
Development Economics, Business Impact, and 
Community Economic Development 
Scheduling and Summary 
Traffic Working Group 






















Community Economic Development 
St. Botolph Working Group 
Impact on Back Bay Busine~ses 
Working Group on Business O~portunities 
Working Group on Jobs and Training 
Preliminary Physical Design Presentation 
Working Group on Business Opportunities 
Neighborhood Stabilization 
Working Group on Business Opportunities and Jobs 
Draft Recommendations and Revised Schematic 
Design 
Comments and Revisions of Draft submitted to CRC 
Discussion of Revisions 
Recommendation ·submitted to State, MBTA, developer 
Introductory Meeting 
Environmental Impact Review 
Pedestrian and Design Issues 
Economic Impact 
Traffic Impact 
Socia 1 Impact 









August 16 : 
August 30: 






Apri 1 14: 
July 17: 
September 24: 
Review of necessity for Copley Place re-study 
General meeting to start new round of CRC 
meetings (UIDC handout #1) 
Review of new design and program (UIDC handout #2) 
Review of pub! ic benefits and public funding 
requirements (UIDC handout #3) 
Transportation planning issues - session 1, 
Methodologies (UIDC handout #4) 
Environmental issues - session 1. Outline of 
proposed EIR/EIS (UIDC handout #5) 
Review of scope of services for retail and 
housing impact studies (No handout for meeting 
#6) 
Transportation Planning issues - session I I 
( UIDC handout #7) 
Design review and housing review (No handout 
for meeting #8) 
Environmental issues - session I I. Geology, 
energy conservation, noise, historic properties, 
wind, air quality (UIDC handout #9) 
Environmental issues - session Ill. Traffic 
and air quality (UIDC handout #10) 
Workshop on housing impact report. (ERA handout -
no U I DC handout) 
Meeting on Pub! ic Approvals Process 
Meeting on Retail Impact Study 




Design Review Subcommittee kick-off; 
update 










I . Introduction 
Copley Place is an exemplary project which deserves HUD's support through 
the Urban Development Action Grant Program. At present the site is a 
barren and underutilized turnpike interchange. It pays no taxes , provides 
C . 1 
no jobs , offers no housing , shopping or other services. The proposed project, 
through the infu sion of $300 million in private funds , will transform this 
wasteland into a vibrant urban resource. When it is completed, it will provide 
more than 6,000 permanent jobs, many to presently unemployed Boston residents, 
as well as millions of dollars in taxes to the City and State . It will house 
100 families of mixed-income and races and will serve as a unifying force for 
neighborhoods that have been separated by physical barriers for over a 
hundred years. 
The planning process for Copley Place has also been exemplary. The developer 
has worked with community groups, public agencies and individuals over a 
three year period to produce a project which is responsive to the concerns of 
the surrounding neighborhoods. As a result of this process a number of 
significant changes were made in the project proposal. 
Copley Place will be an as set to the City as a whole and to the surrounding 
. neighborhoods in particular. Contrary to the assertions contained in the 
Administrative Complaint, Copley Place will have at most a minimal effect upon 
housin g in t he su rrounding n eighborhoods . The changes taking place in 
these neighbor hoods are due to a variety of demographic forces, some of 
which are national in scope. The City believes that an objective evaluation of 
all aspects of this project will show conclusively that Copley Place should 
receive UDAG fun ding . 
II. Boston is . An Eligible Applicant for UDAG Funds 
The City meets all criteria for UDAG eligibility. 
(a) It meets the minimum standards of physical and economic distress . 
(b) It has an outstanding record in providing housipg for persons of low-
and moderate-income. 
(c) It has demonstrated results in providing equal opportunity for low- and 
moderate-income persons and members of minority groups. In particular, 
the City is in substantial compliance with the conditions on its most 
recent Community Development Block Grant. 
III. UIDC Does Require UDAG Funds to Construct Copley Place 
A UDAG grant in the amount of $19,724,000 has been determined to be war-
ranted by the Boston Redevelopment Authority's review of the Copley Place 
project. The City recognizes the large up-front costs inherent in developing 
this site which have succeeded in keeping this parcel vacant for the past two 
decades. These activities add greatly to the construction costs of the develop-
i 
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mcnt withou t adding directly to the cash flow of the project. To confirm its 
analysis , the BRA retained an independent consultant which has advised it 
that the project sponsor's cost estimates and income projections are reasonable 
and that, based on these estimates , the project would not reach a fair level 
of return without such a UDAG investment. 
Contrary to the complainant's allegation, the developer was exploring funding 
sources for public improvement type activities in the Spring of 1978 and 
actively addressing public assistance for the development in the Fall of that 
year. 
The ratio of private investment to UDAG funds will be 15 to 1, far exceeding 
HUD guidelin, . . 
IV. The Boston City Council Did Act Upon the Application With Sufficient 
Information to Evaluate the Project's Impact Upon the City and Its Residents 
The UDAG application meets all HUD requirements for public review and 
approval by the local governing body, which in fact voted unanimously to 
submit the application. ·More important, the planning of the project involved 
unprecedented public review from the very beginning. Over 40 Citizen 
Review Committee meetings were held over three years with neighborhood 
groups to review the project and obtain their input. As a result of these 
meetings major changes were made in many aspects of the project and signif-
icant affirmative action provisions achieved. 
V. Copley Place Will Not Have A Negative Impact On the Special Problems 
Of Low- and Moderate-Income and Minority People 
The overall impact of Copley Place will be positive through the provis10n of 
jobs and housing for low- and moderate-income people, taxes to support City 
services, and loan repayments by the developer that will support neighborhood 
development ·projects. While there may be modest impacts in terms of increased 
demand for housing which may contribute to displacement, this effect is 
expected to be minimal and the City has policies which will be able to mitigate 
even these forces. 
A. Housing and Displacement 
1. The Administrative Complaint confuses natural demographic changes 
with displacement. 
2. The City is meeting its obligations to minimize the effects of any 
displacement which may occur. 
3. Displacement is a complex phenomenon, not well understood. What 
is happening in the neighborhoods surrounding the Copley Place 
site is the result of many different factors, some of them national in 
scope, others more localized. These neighborhoods were in a 
serious state of physical and economic distress for decades (cf 
extensive documentation submitted to HUD to qualify the South End, 
Fenway and South Cove as urban renewal areas) and have only 
recently begun to show signs of renewed vigor . Thanks to signif i-
cant expenditure by the Federal, State and local governments , the 
most serious physical blight has been eliminated, public works and 
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facilities improved, and over 6, 200 units of new or substantially 
rehal'ilitated housing has been provided in the impact area for low-
and moderate-income people. A recent survey of the South End 
neighborhood indicates overwhelming approval by the residents for 
the changes which have taken place and a hope that revitalization 
will continue. Displacement as an issue was articulated by only 3% 
of the population. 
4. There is no evidence that Copley Place will cause any displacement, 
though there will certainly be some additional demand for housing 
caused by the project's employees. The best estimates are that this 
impact will be small in the immediate area (within a 15-minute walk) 
an .. so dispersed outside ·that area as to be unmeasurable. Many of 
the jobs generated by the project will go to present residents of 
5. 
6. 
the area or the City of Boston, including people who are presently 
unemployed, underemployed, or not in the labor market. The 
experience with other major developments in this area - which did 
have a significant effect on housing demand - does not apply today. 
Those developments took place at a time when housing prices in the 
impact area were relatively low and constituted a major inducement 
to immigration. This is no longer the case. 
The South End, the area most frequently cited in the Administrative 
Complaint, has been subject to a great many changes in recent 
decades. It is not at all clear that what is happening there could 
be called displacement. It certainly is clear that throughout the 
period when displacement was allegedly taking place, large numbers 
of Blacks and Hispanics were moving into the area. Since this is 
not a phenomenon normally associated with displacement, it suggests 
that a more complex process is underway and that any generalizations 
about the impact of Copley Place are subject to qualifications. 
Should there be any displacement as a result of Copley Place, the 
City does already have programs in place to address this problem. 
There already exist in the surrounding neighborhoods 6, 200 units 
of new or substantially rehabilitated subsidized housing. The 
existence of this housing guarantees that the impact area will remain 
economically and racially mixed. Furthermore, an additional 1, 500 
subsidized housing units are presently in various stages of develop-
ment and will be available to any families who may be displaced. 
Close to 800 market rate units are also being developed and will 
help to absorb any demand in the impact area caused by Copley 
Place. The City also has rent control and condominium conversion 
ordinances which will help to mitigate the effect of market forces on 
low- and moderate-income tenants . 
B. The Jobs Policy 
The City has adopted strong affirmative action prov1s1ons for both construction 
and . permanent jobs generated by Copley Place. The requirements for construc-
tion hiring include enforcement procedures which provide for final review by 
an independent third party. To further ensure compliance with these require-
ments, the City will make referrals from its own training programs and from 
those of neighborhood based organizations. A placement office will be established 
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on-site for the hiring of permanent employees and the developer 1.vill report 
on a quarterly basis to the Mayor and City Council on the number of residents 
working in the project. 
VI. Copley Place Will Further Equal Opportunity 
As noted above, strong affirmative action requirements will ensure that low-
and moderate-income individuals, especially members of minority groups, will 
benefit from the economic activity generated by the project. There is, on the 
other hand , no evidence to indicate that minorities will suffer disproportionately 
from any poten tial jropacts of the project. Nevertheless, any minorities who 
were to be displaced would have access to a wide range of housing options 
. both existing stock and anticipated new developments - both within their 
present neighborhoods and in the rest of Boston. 
VII. Environmental Plan.ning Is Proceeding Without Substantial Problems 
The environmental review process for Copley Place is expected to be completed 
in a timely fashion. Draft responses to 95% of the comments received on the 
draft EIS/EIR have already been prepared and the final EIS/EIR is expected 
to be submitted for review in September, with completion of the total process 
in October of this year. 
The project is in compliance with all applicable energy conservation requirements 
and there is no reason to believe that adequate energy will not be available. 
The shadows cast by the project will have only a minimal effect on Copley 
Square compared to those cost by existing development. 
The traffic and parking impact studies carried out for the draft EIS/EIR 
follow accepted principles and indicate only minimal impact, especially in view 
of improved transit accessibility and the City's commitment to a resident 
sticker parking program. 
VIII. Conclusion 
The City of Boston has prepared a detailed response to each point raised in 
the Administrative Complaint. These responses have been based on HUD 
regulations, the City's performance, and the facts of this situation. An 
unbiased appraisal of the case would clearly recognize the validity of the 
City's UDAG application for Copley Place. In the final analysis this position 
rests on the basic premise of the UDAG program. Copley Place is a project 
by which Federal funds will leverage substantial private invesbnent to the 
direct and indirect benefit of low- and moderate-income people, especially 
members of minority groups. Under these circumstance, HUD will best fulfill 
its mandate by approving the City's application for UDAG funding. Copley 
Place deserves HUD's support. 
iv 
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Urban Investment and Development Co. of Oiicago, 
a subsidiary of Ae tna Life & Casualty . 
9.5 acre land and air rights in Boston's Back Bay 
with direct access to and fron the ~fassachusetts 
Turnpike, the ~IBTA's Orange Line (under construction) , 
AMTRAK and the Boston and ~!aine Railroad. 
- - An 804-room Westin llL'<tny hotel. 
- -A 1, 145 Marrfott convention-style hotel. 
8~5,000 square feet of commercial office space. 
A 385,000 square foot retail center -- which includes 
100 ,000 square foot \leiman. -.'·!arcus specialty depart:'lent 
store and a 53, 000 square foot Bonwit Teller -- \ 'ith 
shops, restaurants, cinemas and community-oriented 
retail space. 
100 mixed-income residential units. 
1,432 parking spaces. 
1983-1984 
$400,000,000 
FINA!~CING ARR~~GED BY: Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York 
The First National Bank of Oiicago 








The First National Bank of Boston 
Security Pacific National Bank 
Seattle-First :Jational Bank 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
The Architects Collaborative Inc. , of Cambridge, ~lA.. 
Turner Construction Company, of New York, NY 
The Architects Collaborative Inc., of Cambridge, M..\. 
Perini Corporation, of Framingham, ~1A 
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FOR RELE~E : At Will 
COPLEY 
PLACE COi\1TACT: Teri F. Weidner 
- - COPLEY PLACE - -
~·ill TI -MILLION OOLLAR DE\'ELO?.•IENT FORETELLS 
NEW LAi'filvlA.RK IN BOSTON 
BOSTON -- Copley Place, at $400 million the largest mixed-use development 
in Boston and one of the most ambitious currently undenv-ay nationwide, is well 
on its way to becoming ·the newest landmark in this history-making city. 
It was November 13, 1980, when Urban Investment and Development Co. of 
Chicago, a subsidiary of Aetna Life & Casualty, broke ground for Copley Place, 
cu111inating over four years of pre-construction project planning. "In the 
first year after groundbreaking, we have seen rapid construction progress, sub-
stantial leasing activity for both the office and retail space, the· closing of 
project financing commitments, and completion of architectural and interior 
design planning for each project component," said Kenneth A. Himmel, senior 
vice president and project manager. ''Hundreds of construction workers hav: 
been employed on the site, and their ntnnbers will expand to nearly 1,000 next 
year." 
\ 
TI-IE PROJECT COMPONENTS ( 
When fully operational in 1984, Copley Place will include two major 
hotels -- the 804-room deluxe Westin Hotel-Copley Place, Boston, and a 1145-
room convention-style Marriott Hotel. A 385,000 square foot retail mall will 
feature a two-level gallery of shops, a unique collection of restaurants, and 
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S'pecialty departmeut store in New E11gland and Bonwit Teller. The ~roject will also 
include four office buildings with a total of 845,000 square feet of Class A office 
s~ace that surrounds a nine-story central Atriun, 100 mixed-income residential u.11its, 
~11d indoor ~arkL11g for 1,432 cars. 
Unlike any other major r etail cente r in Boston and ~ew England, Copley Place 
\dll offer shop~ ~rs an "inside street," two levels of shops and restaurants in an 
interior landscaped setting that 1vill reflect the materials and textures of Boston's 
historic Back Bay. Like architect Frederick Law Olmsted's famed Emerald :'-Jecklace 
concept for linking Boston proper with parks and thoroughfares, the Atrium space 
in Copley Place will be landscaped with seasonal flowers, shrubs and trees, designed 
to provide a year-round atmosphere encouraging walking and browsing. A nrulti-story 
water sculpture will provide the centerpiece of the Atrium. 
FI~A1\JCING 
Copley Place holds the distinction of being awarded tlS.8 million from the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the largest Urban Development 
Action Grant (UDAG) ever. The UDAG program was begun during the Carter administra-
tion to encourage investment of private capital in urban centers. The City of 
Boston will administer the Copley Place UDAG, $15.5 million of which is a loan, 
the remainder a grant. Interest from Urban's repayment of the loan portion to the 
City over the next 27 years will be eannarked for Boston's Neighborhood Development 
Loan Bank, creating a unique fund of $42 million for improvements to nearby neigh-
borhoods. 
More than $350 million in private financing for the complex will be provided 
via three separate loans. Financing was arranged by Morgan Guaranty Tn1st Company 
of New York, The First National Bank of Chicago and Citibank, N.A. of New York. 
- more -
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These lead banks hill be joined by three others, Tne First National Bank of Boston, 
Security Pacific National Bank, Los Angeles, and Seattle-First National Bank, in 
providing financing. 
SITE CCNPLEXI1Y 
The development is being built on a 9.5 acre air rights site adjacent to 
Boston's Cople, Square, an historic focal point of commercial and residential 
activity. The site, and air rights above it, are being leased to Urban from the 
~lassachusetts Turnpike Authority which owns the property. 
Cleared in the late 1950' s to make way for the ~lassachusetts Turnpike Ext en-
sion, the land today includes the major Boston interchange of the ~!assachusetts 
Turnpike, rail beds for .1.rntrak and Conrail, and the Orange line of Boston's rapid 
transit service (presently undergoing relocation). These activities will cont inue 
to occur llllinterrupted beneath the completed Copley Place comolex. Three rna ior 
city thoroughfares also border the site. Comprehensive roadway redesign, relocation 
of electric, gas, telephcne and water lines were necessary to prepare the complex 
site for construction. 
PUBLIC I~VOLVDIENT 
A public design review process, unprecedented in Boston history, and possibly 
nationwide, has involved hundreds of citizens representing corrnnercial and residential 
commtu1ities surrounding the site. The State and Urban agreed at the project's out-
set to invite neighborhood associations, advocacy groups and several goveTIL~ent 
agencies to participate actively in the planning process to maximize conmrunity 
benefits and enhance the pre-development revie1v of all project impacts on tte 
neighborhoods. 
- more -
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Over 150 presentations on Copley Place were made by the developer to illvolved 
groups. A unique Citizens Review Corrnnittee (CRC) was fanned to identify design, 
envirorunental and other crnrrrnunity conceTilS, and· to develop guideline r ecommendations 
for the project plans. A reorganized group, knmvn as the Design Advisory Group 
(DAG), still meets regularly to follow progress and architectural development of 
the project. 
PUBLIC BENEFITS 
Copley Place has . already provided hundreds of construction jobs to Bostonians 
. and area residents. Over 1,000 workers will have been employed ill construction 
upon completion. Copley Place will then mean 6,500 new, pennanent jobs for the 
city. Affinr~tive action agreements are the most comprehensive in tte country for 
private development, including goals for Boston residents and residents of neigh-
borhoods adjoining the site . 
Coverillg the Turnpike, the project will rej oill the Back Bay a.Ttd 
South End neighborhoods that have been divided by Turnpi~e ramps and railroad 
tracks for over a decade. The stores, hotels, restaurants and offices located in-
side Copley Place will directly or indirectly provide an estimated $2 7 million 
, annually in City and State taxes. The Westin Hotel-Copley Place, Boston and the 
Marriott Hotel will attract sought-after convention business and tourist income, 
while Nejman-Marcus and other top scale retailers will create the most attractive 
shopping environment in the city and metropolitan region. 
EASILY ACCESSIBLE LOC~TION 
Copley Place will be easily accessible to motorists, pedestrians, and visitors 
to Boston. Logan International Airport, Government Center, the Financial District 
and Downto\\111 Boston are only minutes away. ~1otorists on the Turnpike can exit 
- more -
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directly at the Copley Square interchange . The Turnpike provides a direct link 
with local primary arterial roads and the Interstate highway system. 
Because all Turnpike activity will be under a deck cover, the area wi ll be 
re-opened to safe pedestrian access. Copley Place lvill be linked to the Pruden-
tial C12nter 1.vi th a glass pedestrian-only bridge, and will join the Prudential 
\-ii.th the J ohn Hancock office tower. Additionally, the pro j ect will directly 
link Copley Square with !'-Jeirr,an->1arcus, Saks Fifth Avenue and Lord & Taylor. 
The new Back Bay Station, under construct ion across Dartmouth Street from 
Copley Place, wi ll be utilized by some 55,000 rail passengers daily. The project 
will also be access ible via :'-fassachusetts Bay Transit Authority buses and rapid 
service trains. 
LEASING 
Retail leasing agent for the project is Strouse-Greenberg and Co. (617-523-
4080) and Ryan, El liot and Company, Inc. (617-537-8220) is exclusive agent for the 
office component. 
A.BOITT URBA\I 
Urban Investment and Development Co., a subsidiary of Aetna Life & Casualty , 
, is one of the nation's largest producers of quality improved property. At the 
close of 1981, Urban had more than $1 billion ~n assets withoperations in lo 
states. The company develops and owns office buildings, mix:ed-use structures, 
shopping centers, planned corram.m.ities, luxury hotels, and other corrnnercial and 
industrial properties. The Chicago-based company has offices in Boston, Denver, 
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SOUTHWEST CORRIDOR DEC~ D 
((LOCAL RESIDENTIAL TRAFFIC ONLY) [ (PEDESTRIANS ONLY) 
~:-- IOO 
Copley Pl•z• Hotel 
Hass . Turnp ike - to remain ' 
8 & A Ra i lroad - to be relocated 
Turnpike Ex i t Ramps - to rema in 
S.W.C. Deck Cover - ~ estrlcted use 
Harcourt St . (South) - restricted use 
Wa t er Ha in -
Harcourt St. North - res ' cted use 
Ramp D - to be relocated 
Ramp C - t o be removed 
Ramp 8 - to rema in 
Copley Place I siie 
... - ·"'-*'-"" 
,._...._ lt•T. 11 . 1910 
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Copley Place Building Plans at 
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Area, . Rentable 
Copley Plar.e Program s. f. Area, s. f. 
Western International 
Hotel 
Luxury hotel. 781 rooms 747,260 
Parking, 275 spaces 100,540 
Marriott Hotel 
Convention hotel, 1,008 
rooms 804,31 0 
-~~ Extensive meeting facili ties Neiman-Marcus 96,090 96,090 
Retail Mall Shops 250,420 250.420 
Community Retail Shops 8,000 8,000 
Cinemas 16,000 16,000 
SeNice Level, Mall, 
Circulation, SeNice 
Corridors, Mechanical 150,120 
Office 771 ,400 699,940 
Housing 
100 Units 85,000 
Parking 
Retail, Offi ce. and 
Marriott Hotel 
.. \\\\\...__~ ...... '-.U. 1.157 spaces 404,920 
\ ;_:r\. """' ~.J'l:""' J Total Area 3.434,060 1,070.450 
Mi>11r1 of Copley Pl11ce 
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